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In this semi-autobiographical essay I explore the representation and per-
formance of imaginative inquiry practices in educational inquiry and other dis-
ciplines, with particular reference to ‘thought experiments’ in the natural
sciences and comparable practices in the arts, humanities, and social sciences.
I share a number of experiences of writing as a mode of educational inquiry,
with particular reference to narrative experiments inspired by Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari’s figuration of the rhizome — a process characterised as
rhizosemiotic play — and demonstrate the generativity of intertextual readings
of selected fictions in catalysing them.
Story and narrative theory
The Left Hand of Darkness is a critically acclaimed novel by Ursula Le Guin
(1969) and is often referred to as one of the first major works of feminist
science fiction (or SF,  to use a term I prefer). The novel’s first-person narrator1
is an envoi from a galactic federation to the planet Gethen, and he begins by
stating: ‘I'll make my report as if I told a story, for I was taught as a child that
Truth is a matter of the imagination. The soundest fact may fail or prevail in
the style of its telling’ (Le Guin, 1969:9). 
I begin with this brief quotation from one of my favourite storytellers
because it (and the story it introduces) encapsulates some of the key concepts
that have informed and guided my practice as a curriculum scholar and edu-
cational research methodologist for more than two decades, namely, story,
imagination, and fiction (with particular reference to SF and the ambiguous
relations of ‘fact’, ‘truth’, and fiction). I will briefly explain how I think about
and use each of these concepts before demonstrating in more detail how I
have most recently performed narrative experiments in educational inquiry by
deploying imaginative reading and writing practices that I characterise as
‘rhizosemiotic play’.
The elemental significance of stories in human experience is succinctly
conveyed in two brief lines from Muriel Rukeyser’s (1968:115) poem, The
Speed of Darkness:
The universe is made of stories,
not of atoms.
In other words, for many purposes in social (and educational) inquiry, the
worlds we inhabit (perceptual, existential, phenomenal, imagined, virtual, etc.)
can usefully be understood as being made of stories. The idea that the uni-
verse is made of atoms is just one of those stories.
I should emphasise that my methodological interests in story and narra-
tive diverge from what Michael Connelly and Jean Clandinin (1990) call
‘narrative inquiry’ — an approach to teacher education and teacher profes-
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sional development that focuses on personal storytelling and that has become
popular in many countries, especially Canada and the USA. Connelly and
Clandinin argue that much of what we claim to ‘know’ in education comes
from telling each other stories of educational experience, and ‘narrative in-
quiry’ is thus concerned with analysing and criticising the stories we tell and
hear and read in the course of our work — children’s stories, teachers’ stories,
student teachers’ stories, and our own and other teacher educators’ stories.
My initial enthusiasm for Connelly and Clandinin’s conception of ‘narrative
inquiry’ was relatively short-lived, principally because I found their silence on
the implications of poststructuralism and deconstruction for narrative-based
research to be indefensible. This silence persists in their subsequent work
(see, for example, Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).
The uses to which I have put concepts of story and narrative in educa-
tional inquiry are more aligned with the ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences
from the mid-1970s onwards, during which narrative theory migrated from
literary studies to many other disciplines (see, for example, Mink, 1974;
Polkinghorne, 1988; Richardson, 1990; Rorty, 1979; Stone, 1979). As Kenneth
Knoespel (1991:100-101) writes:
Narrative theory has challenged literary critics to recognize not only the
various strategies used to configure particular texts within the literary
canon, but to realize how forms of discourse in the natural and human
sciences are themselves ordered as narratives. In effect narrative theory
invites us to think of all discourse as taking the form of a story. 
My initial response to this invitation was to examine the ways in which the
discourses of curriculum areas in which I have a special interest — environ-
mental education and science education — are configured as stories, with
particular reference to poststructuralist questioning of narrative authority in
the sciences and other disciplines. Many of these inquiries were framed by my
practical interests in appraising the adequacy of the conventional narrative
strategies used by science and environmental educators in their work and
with exploring possible ways of expanding their range and variety (see, for
example, Gough, 1991; 1993a; 1993b; 1994b).
Fictions, ‘facts’ and ‘truth’
These initial inquiries led me to explore ways in which the types of stories we
usually classify as fiction — and the modes of storytelling that produce them
— might inform reading and writing in educational research (see, for example,
Gough, 1994a; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2002). The question at issue here is whe-
ther it is possible, at least in principle, to establish intersubjectively reliable
distinctions between ‘fiction’ on the one hand and particular constructions of
‘reality’ that we can call ‘factual’ or ‘truthful’ on the other. Although it is
defensible to assert that reality exists beyond texts, much of what we think
of as ‘real’ is — and can only be — apprehended through texts. For example,
most of what we call history is inaccessible to us except in textual form.
Furthermore, much of what we call ‘direct’ experience is mediated textually
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and intertextually (see Gough, 1993c). What is at issue here is not belief in
the real but confidence in its representation. As Richard Rorty (1979:375),
puts it, ‘to deny the power to “describe” reality is not to deny reality’ and ‘the
world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not’ (Rorty, 1989:5).
In other words, the conventional binary opposition of reality and fiction
— and other binaries implied by this opposition, such as fact/fiction and
real/imaginary — does not mean that it is possible to distinguish clearly
between textual representations of the world ‘out there’ and other worlds
constructed in texts. My own doubts about the referential adequacy of such
binaries do not constitute an antirealist position but, rather, contribute to my
distrust of storytelling practices that seem to be motivated by what Sandra
Harding (1993:193) calls ‘the longing for “one true story” that has been the
psychic motor for [modern] western science’. Desires for ‘one true story’ have
driven the construction of narrative strategies in which fact and fiction are
mutually exclusive categories and particular kinds of facts, such as ‘scientific
facts’ and ‘historical facts’, are equated with ‘reality’ — claims to ontological
status for the worlds that scientists and historians imagine.
Fact and fiction are much closer, both culturally and linguistically, than
these narrative strategies imply. A fiction, in the sense in which it derives
from fictio, is something fashioned by a human agent. The etymology of ‘fact’
also reveals its reference to human action; a fact is the thing done, ‘that which
actually happened’ (OED), the Latin factum being the neuter past participle of
facere, do. In other words, both fact and fiction refer to human performance,
but ‘fiction’ is an active form — the act of fashioning — whereas ‘fact’ des-
cends from a past participle, a part of speech which disguises the generative
act. Facts are testimonies to experience and, in Linda Hutcheon’s (1989:57)
words, are ‘events to which we have given meaning’. Thus, historical facts are
the testimonies that historians make from their experiences of using disci-
plined procedures of evidence production and interpretation to construct mea-
ning — to produce events that are meaningful within their traditions of social
relationships and organisation. Similarly, scientific facts are testimonies to
the experiences of scientists as they use their specialised technologies to gene-
rate and inscribe data. Donna Haraway (1989:4) demonstrates how closely
fact and fiction can be related in her description of biology as a narrative
practice: 
Biology is the fiction appropriate to objects called organisms; biology
fashions the facts ‘discovered’ from organic beings. Organisms perform for
the biologist, who transforms that performance into a truth attested by
disciplined experience; i.e. into a fact, the jointly accomplished deed or
feat of the scientist and the organism … Both the scientist and the orga-
nism are actors in a story-telling practice.
Performing educational inquiry as ‘actors in a story-telling practice’ means,
in part, seeing fact and fiction as mutually constitutive — recognising that
facts are not only important elements of the stories we fashion from them but
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also that they are given meaning by the storytelling practices which produce
them.
Therefore, I argue that the binary opposition of fact and fiction is itself a
fiction — a story fashioned to rationalise the strategies used by modernist
researchers in the sciences and social sciences to produce facts. Rather than
thinking in these terms, I suggest that there may be some virtue in recon-
ceiving all the stories we tell in education as fictions — as stories fashioned
for particular purposes — especially those that most resolutely proclaim that
they are ‘factual’. As Le Guin (1989:44-45) writes:
Fiction in particular, narration in general, may be seen … as an active
encounter with the environment by means of posing options and alterna-
tives, and an enlargement of present reality by connecting it to the un-
verifiable past and the unpredictable future. A totally factual narrative,
were there such a thing, would be passive: a mirror reflecting all without
distortion … but fiction does not reflect, nor is the narrator’s eye that of
a camera … Fiction connects possibilities … and by doing so it is useful
to us.
If we think of all stories of educational inquiry as being fictions, we may be
less likely to privilege without question those that pretend not to be, and more
likely to judge each story on its particular merits in serving worthwhile pur-
poses in education. 
Thought experiments
The academic curricula and research protocols that predominate in most
education systems and institutions in modern, western, industrial nations
(and in systems and institutions modelled on them) tend not to teach learners
that ‘truth is a matter of the imagination’, despite the crucial roles that
imagination (literally the ability to produce images in one’s mind) has played
in the development of many disciplines. For example, thought experiments
have been particularly significant in the history of the physical sciences. The
term ‘thought experiment’ came to the English language in the late-19th or
early-20th century through translations of papers by the Austrian physicist
Ernst Mach (1897; 1905) in which he used the mixed German-Latin word
Gedankenexperiment (literally, experiment conducted in the thoughts).  Some2
philosophers now use the term in a relatively narrow sense. For example, Roy
Sorensen (1992:255) defines a thought experiment as ‘an experiment that
purports to achieve its aim without benefit of execution’, which might be
because circumstances preclude physical testing procedures. Other writers,
such as James Brown (2004:1126), prefer a looser characterisation:
It’s difficult to say precisely what thought experiments are. Luckily, it’s
also unimportant. We know them when we see them, and that’s enough
to make discussion possible. A few features are obvious. Thought expe-
riments are carried out in the mind and involve something akin to experi-
ence; that is, we typically see something happening in a thought experi-
ment. Often there is more than mere observation. As in a real experiment,
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there might be calculating, some application of theory, guesswork, and
conjecture. The best way to get a grip on what thought experiments are
is to simply look at lots of examples.
Some of the best-known examples of thought experiments are those perfor-
med by the innovative physicists who pioneered what we might now call
postmodern physics in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. As Aspasia
Moue, Kyriakos Masavetas and Haido Karayianni (2006:61) note, these expe-
riments were often the subjects of conversations or correspondence with each
other, and were used to get their points across and to dramatise the revolu-
tionary and/or paradoxical aspects of their theoretical discoveries or explana-
tions. Erwin Schrödinger’s cat (quantum mechanics) and Albert Einstein’s
elevator (general relativity) and train (special relativity) are now understood as
significant ‘events’ in the histories of these disciplines. Since ‘thought
experiment’ entered the English language, the term has been applied retro-
spectively to similarly significant speculations in physical science, including
James Maxwell’s demon (thermodynamics, ca 1871), Galileo Galilei’s free fall
experiment (disproving Aristotle's theory of gravity, ca 1638), and Simon
Stevin’s inclined plane (geometry and physics, ca 1583).  These scientific3
thought experiments are a species of fiction — stories fashioned along the
lines of ‘let’s say this or that is such and so, and see what happens …’ (Le
Guin, 1979:156) and they thus work in the way that Le Guin characterizes
fiction above: they connect possibilities and by doing so are useful to us.
Despite the ubiquity and utility of thought experiments in the history and
philosophy of science, science education textbooks and curricula rarely
foreground their significance and, where they do, tend to diminish their imagi-
native dimensions. Recent studies in the UK (see, for example, Gilbert &
Reiner, 2000; Reiner, 1998; Reiner & Gilbert 2000) suggest that school and
university physics textbooks tend to conflate thought experiments with
thought simulations. In simulations, the behaviour of a physical phenomenon
is illustrated rather than tested, theory is taken for granted and embedded
rather than being tentative and emergent, and the outcome is assumed rather
than anticipated (this distortion of an important concept in science is similar
to the distortion that many science teachers and textbooks reproduce by
persistently representing demonstrations of physical phenomena — such as
heating a bimetallic strip until it bends — as ‘experiments’). 
It should be clear that thought experiments are not only the province of
science. As Le Guin (1979:156) points out, many SF stories can be read as
thought experiments. Thus, for example, in Frankenstein Mary Shelley (1992/
1818) writes: ‘let us say that a young doctor creates a human being in his
laboratory …’. In Dune, Frank Herbert (1968/1965) writes: ‘let us say that
massive desertification threatens a planet very like Earth …’. In The Left Hand
of Darkness, Le Guin (1969) writes: ‘let us say that humans are androgy-
nous…’. Le Guin (1979:156) also insists that such thought experiments are
neither extrapolative nor predictive — their form is not, ‘if this goes on, this
is what will happen’ — but, rather, are attempts to produce alternative
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representations of present circumstances and uncertainties; within stories so
conceived, ‘thought and intuition  can move freely within bounds set only by4
the terms of the experiment’:
The purpose of a thought-experiment, as the term was used by Schrö-
dinger and other physicists, is not to predict the future — indeed Schrö-
dinger’s most famous thought-experiment goes to show that the ‘future,’
on the quantum level, cannot be predicted — but to describe reality, the
present world.
Science fiction is not predictive; it is descriptive (emphasis in 
original).
Thought experiments in science and literature are not only comparable imagi-
native practices, but also — in some circumstances at least — may be com-
plementary in other ways. For example, in Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in
Contemporary Literature and Science, Katherine Hayles (1990:xi) examines the
late-20th century preoccupation with nonlinear dynamics in both literature
and science and demonstrates how different disciplinary traditions may si-
multaneously be informed by ‘isomorphic paradigms’:
different disciplines, sufficiently distant from one another so that direct
influence seems unlikely, … nevertheless focus on similar kinds of prob-
lems [at] about the same time and base their formulations on isomorphic
assumptions .… Different disciplines are drawn to similar problems be-
cause the concerns underlying them are highly charged within a prevai-
ling cultural context. Moreover, different disciplines base the theories they
construct on similar presuppositions because these are the assumptions
that guide the constitution of knowledge in a given episteme. This position
implies, of course, that scientific theories and models are culturally con-
ditioned, partaking of and rooted in assumptions that can be found at
multiple sites throughout the culture.
More recently, David Butt (2007) has shown that Ferdinand de Saussure and
Albert Einstein were engaging in similar epistemological projects at around
the same time, with Saussure introducing the principle of relativity of sign
systems just as Einstein was introducing the principle of relativity of time and
space. Butt also demonstrates that the texts of certain modernist poets (e.g.
Wallace Stevens, Kenneth Slessor) and novelists (e.g. D.H. Lawrence) enact
similar linguistic thought experiments to those conducted by Einstein and
other theoretical physicists of his era. 
During the past 4–5 years I have become more aware of the similarities
between thought experiments (in science and literature) and the ‘narrative
experiments’ I have attempted to perform and represent in educational in-
quiry. In the remainder of this essay, I will demonstrate some of the imagina-
tive reading and writing practices that have been generative for me (and,
apparently, for my peers).
Narrative experiments and rhizosemiotic play
My approach to any question, problem or issue of educational inquiry is now
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shaped by my methodological disposition to produce texts of the kind that
Laurel Richardson (2001) calls ‘writing-stories’ and that I call ‘narrative
experiments’ (Gough, 2004a). Richardson (2001:35) argues (persuasively in
my view) that:
Writing is a method of discovery, a way of finding out about yourself and
your world. When we view writing as a method, we experience ‘language-
in-use,’ how we ‘word the world’ into existence … And then we ‘reword’
the world, erase the computer screen, check the thesaurus, move a
paragraph, again and again. This ‘worded world’ never accurately, pre-
cisely, completely captures the studied world, yet we persist in trying.
Writing as a method of inquiry honors and encourages the trying, recog-
nizing it as emblematic of the significance of language (emphases in
original).
Like Richardson (2001:35), ‘I write because I want to find something out. I
write in order to learn something that I did not know before I wrote it’, and I
increasingly find it generative to bring objects of inquiry into intertextual play
with Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy and ‘fictions’ in the broadest sense
of the term. I use the term ‘essay’ here both as a verb — to attempt, to try, to
test — and as a noun. In theoretical inquiry an essay can serve similar pur-
poses to an experiment in empirical research — a methodical way of investi-
gating a question, problem or issue — although I find more appropriate
analogies for my work in the experimental arts than in the experimental
sciences.  Both ‘essay’ and the related term ‘assay’ come to English speakers5
through the French essayer from the Latin exigere, to weigh. Thus, I write
essays to test ideas, to ‘weigh’ them up, to give me (and eventually, I hope, my
colleagues) a sense of their worth. 
In order to demonstrate how I go about writing ‘to find something out’ I
will focus on a process that I have deployed in three narrative experiments
inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) figuration of the rhizome — a pro-
cess that I characterise as rhizosemiotic play. My ‘reports’ of these experi-
ments are available elsewhere (Gough, 2004b; 2006; 2007), and my intention
here is simply to demonstrate some textual strategies that I use to perform
such experiments, with particular reference to the generativity of intertextual
readings of selected fictions in catalysing them.
  
Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy
Deleuze and Guattari (1994:5) map the ‘geography of reason’ from pre-
Socratic times to the present, a geophilosophy describing relations between
particular spatial configurations and locations and the philosophical forma-
tions that arise in them. ‘Philosophy’, they say, ‘is the discipline that involves
creating concepts’ through which knowledge can be generated. As Michael
Peters (2004) points out, this is very different from the approaches taken by
many analytic and linguistic philosophers who are more concerned with the
clarification of concepts. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) created a new critical language for analysing
thinking as flows or movements across space. Concepts such as assemblage,
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deterritorialisation, lines of flight, nomadology, and rhizome/rhizomatics clearly
refer to spatial relationships and to ways of conceiving ourselves and other
objects moving in space. For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1987:23) dis-
tinguish the ‘sedentary point of view’ that characterizes much western philo-
sophy, history and science from a nomadic subjectivity that allows thought
to move across conventional categories and move against ‘settled’ concepts
and theories. They also distinguish ‘rhizomatic’ thinking from ‘arborescent’
conceptions of knowledge as hierarchically articulated branches of a central
stem or trunk rooted in firm foundations. As Umberto Eco (1984:57) explains,
‘the rhizome is so constructed that every path can be connected with every
other one. It has no center, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially
infinite. The space of conjecture is a rhizome space’.
In a world of increasingly complex information/communication/know-
ledge technologies, the space of educational inquiry is also becoming a ‘rhi-
zome space’ that is more hospitable to nomadic than to sedentary thought.
Rhizome is to a tree as the Internet is to a letter — networking that echoes the
hyperconnectivity of the Internet. The structural reality of a tree and a letter
is relatively simple: a trunk connecting two points through or over a mapped
surface. But rhizomes and the Internet  are infinitely complex and continu-6
ously changing.
RhizomANTics
I began ‘RhizomANTically becoming-cyborg: performing posthuman pedago-
gies’ (Gough, 2004:253) as follows:
Make a rhizome. But you don’t know what you can make a rhizome
with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is going to make a
rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987:246).
So I shall. This paper is a narrative experiment inspired by Deleuze and
Guattari’s (1987) figuration of the rhizome. It is a textual assemblage of
popular and academic  representations of cyborgs that I hope might7
question, provoke and challenge some of the dominant discourses and
assumptions of curriculum, teaching and learning.
Emboldened by Deleuze’s penchant for inventing new terms for his figura-
tions,  I have coined the term ‘rhizomANTic’ (sometimes ‘rhizomantic’) to8
name a methodological disposition that connects Deleuze’s rhizomatics,
ANT (actor-network theory), and Donna Haraway’s (1997:16) ‘invented
category of semANTics, diffractions’ (my caps.).  Diffraction is ‘an optical9
metaphor for the effort to make a difference in the world’, which Haraway
(1994) also represents by the activity of making a ‘cat’s cradle’ — a meta-
phor that imagines the performance of sociotechnical relations as a less
orderly and less functionalist activity than the word ‘network’ often con-
veys. As my reference to Haraway’s work suggests, my engagement with
ANT leans towards those aspects of the theory that John Law (1999)
characterises as ‘after-ANT’. In an annotated bibliography on Law’s ANT
Resource Home Page, he refers to Haraway’s (1997) Modest_Witness@
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Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™ as ‘the best-known
example of the different and partially related radical feminist techno-
science alternative to actor-network theory. The ‘after-ANT’ studies in this
resource in many cases owe as much or more to Haraway as to ANT
itself’.10
I also use the term rhizomantic because much of this essay is about ants.
Why ants? Ants came to my rescue when I was struggling to expand a hastily
written abstract into a presentable conference paper. My abstract, titled
‘Becoming-cyborg: performing posthuman pedagogies’, did little more than
point to the proliferation of cyborg bodies and identities in sites of educational
practice and signal my intention to draw on theoretical frameworks provided
by Deleuze and ANT to explore the pedagogical implications of this prolifera-
tion. I wrote (with unwarranted confidence) that my paper would ‘demonstrate
how a becoming-cyborg teacher might deploy popular and theoretical concep-
tions of cyborgs as heuristics in educational work’, but I had very few ideas
about how I might do this. 
In searching recent literature on cyborgs and education I found ‘A mani-
festo for cyborg pedagogy?’ by Tim Angus, Ian Cook and James Evans (2001),
an account of teaching a university course that was explicitly grounded in
ANT. I was impressed by the authors’ thoughtful theorising of cyborg peda-
gogy but I was curious as to how Deleuzean (con)figurations might ‘add value’
to their approach. That was when the ants appeared — from several directions
simultaneously. In retrospect, I can only surmise that my frequent reading of
the acronym ‘ANT’ brought them out of the recesses of my memory into the
forefront of my consciousness.
I recalled the theoretical ants in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987:22) recol-
lections of writing A Thousand Plateaus — ‘we watched lines leave one plateau
and proceed to another like columns of tiny ants’ — and in Patricia O’Riley’s
(2003:27) description of rhizomes as being ‘like crabgrass, ants, wolf packs,
and children’. I recalled my son’s fascination with the game SimAnt in the
mid-1990s and the giant mutant ants from movies such as Them! (1951) and
Empire of the Ants (1977). But the ants that clamoured more insistently for
my attention were those that populated some of my favourite fictions, such as
H.G. Wells’ (1905) The Empire of the Ants, Bernard Werbers’ (1991) Les
Fourmis trilogy, Philip K. Dick’s (1991/1969) short story, ‘The electric ant’, and
Rudy Rucker’s (1994) novel, The Hacker and the Ants.
The most generative fictional ant came from Jerry Prosser’s (1992) graphic
novel, Cyberantics, which purports to be an annotated version of an illus-
trated children’s book written by an eccentric cyberneticist as a report of his
achievements in building (and setting loose) a cybernetic ant. Cyberantics is
an ingenious (and very amusing) metafiction, a story that, in Patricia Waugh’s
(1984:2) words, ‘draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose
questions about the relationship between fiction and reality’. As a metafiction
Cyberantics functions as a complex system generating multiple interpre-
tations and displays the properties that contemporary science calls chaos and
complexity. Thus, it explores and illustrates, in a form accessible to children
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and adults alike, an important correspondence between postmodern science
and literature. As Peter Stoicheff (1991:85) writes, ‘metafiction and scientific
chaos [and I would add scientific complexity] are embraced by a larger revo-
lution in contemporary thought that examines the similar roles of narrative,
and of investigative procedure, in our “reading” or knowledge of the world’.
Cyberantics can therefore be understood as an alternative representation of
a postmodern science education text. It embeds stories of modern science, a
delightful children’s story, and a satire suitable for children and adults, within
a complex and complicating metafiction that inhabits a conceptual space
shared by much postmodernist science and poststructuralist cultural theo-
rising.
I realised that Cyberantics exemplifies what is missing from Angus et al.’s
(2001) manifesto for cyborg pedagogy: their work is cyber without the antics,
that is, it lacks the art, paradox and humour that might motivate us to ima-
gine and invent maps of networks that experiment with the real rather than
provide mere tracings of it. It is rewarding to note that the authors of this
manifesto have also found this critique generative (James Evans, Ian Cook &
Helen Griffiths, 2008).
Without Cyberantics I doubt that I would have coined ‘rhizomantic’ or
appreciated the interpretive possibilities of this neologism. As soon as I wrote
‘rhizomantic’ as ‘rhizomANTic’ I realized that it signified concisely my suspi-
cion that ANT cannot wholly be accommodated by rhizomatics — it fits, but
it sits a little awkwardly and uncomfortably. I was then able to demonstrate
the extent of this fit by comparing Haraway’s and actor-network theorists’
approaches to writing cyborgs with each other and with the implications of
Deleuze and Guattari’s work.
Fictions as catalysts of rhizosemiotic play
It is beyond the scope of this essay to describe the two other examples of
rhizosemiotic play to which I refer above. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize
that ‘fictions’ — in a broad sense — were again crucial. ‘Shaking the tree,
making a rhizome: towards a nomadic geophilosophy of science education’
(Gough, 2006) was inspired by Peter Gabriel and Youssou N’Dour’s (1989)
song, ‘Shaking the tree’, which celebrates the women’s movement in Africa,
and led me to imagine rhizomes ‘shaking the tree’ of modern western science
education by destabilizing arborescent conceptions of knowledge. Other ‘fic-
tions’ animating this essay include Salvador Dali’s witty sculpture, Homage
to Newton, and Amitav Ghosh’s (1997) The Calcutta Chromosome: A Novel of
Fevers, Delirium, and Discovery, an SF thriller that imagines a counter-history
(and counter-science) of malaria. This essay too has evidently been generative
for my peers (see, for example, Somerville, 2008). 
Similarly, ‘Changing planes: rhizosemiotic play in transnational curricu-
lum inquiry’ (Gough, 2007), was inspired by Ursula Le Guin’s (2004) collection
of linked SF stories, Changing Planes. Le Guin’s pun (‘planes’ refers both to
airplanes and to planes of existence) helped me to ‘play’ with Deleuze and
Guattari’s argument that modes of intellectual inquiry need to account for the
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planes of immanence upon which they operate — the preconceptual fields
presupposed by the concepts that inquiry creates. Curriculum inquiry cur-
rently operates on nationally distinctive planes of immanence, and I speculate
that the internationalisation of curriculum studies might, therefore, require
curriculum scholars to be able to change planes — to move between one plane
of immanence and another and/or to transform their own planes.
Each of these essays takes seriously Deleuze’s (1994:xx) assertion that a
philosophical work should be ‘in part a kind of science fiction’. However, as
I hope I might have demonstrated here, taking Deleuze ‘seriously’ does not
prevent a writer from having a little fun.
A pause in the middle of things: rhizosemiosis and rhythm
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:25) explain that rhizomes have no beginnings or
ends but are always in the middle: beginnings and ends imply a linear move-
ment, whereas working in the middle is about ‘coming and going rather than
starting and finishing’. I agree with Elizabeth St. Pierre (1997: 176) that 
we must learn to live in the middle of things, in the tension of conflict and
confusion and possibility; and we must become adept at making do with
the messiness of that condition and at finding agency within rather than
assuming it in advance of the ambiguity of language and cultural prac-
tice.
Thus, I have no desire to ‘conclude’ this essay but will simply pause ‘in the
middle of things’ to reflect briefly on my ‘finding agency’ within the ambigu-
ities of language and cultural practice represented and performed by thought
experiments, narrative experiments, and rhizosemiotic play.
To reiterate Brown’s (2004:1126) comments on thought experiments in
science, it is ‘difficult to say precisely what thought experiments are’, and I
would say the same for the narrative experiments I perform. But some of the
features of thought experiments (in science) to which Brown refers are also
apparent in my narrative experiments, which ‘are carried out in [my] mind’
and ‘involve something akin to experience’; that is, I ‘typically see something
happening’ (rhizomes shooting, ants roaming), but ‘there is more than mere
observation’. As in a scientific experiment, there is usually ‘some application
of theory, guesswork, and conjecture’. I agree with Brown that ‘the best way
to get a grip on what [narrative] experiments are is to simply look at lots of
examples’, and I invite readers to peruse in further detail those I have referred
to here, among others.  11
Some of the finest and most inspiring examples of narrative experiments
are those performed by great novelists, and their reflections on their own wri-
ting processes can be illuminating. For example, Virginia Woolf (1980:247)
wrote to Vita Sackville-West in 1926:
Style is a very simple matter: it is all rhythm. Once you get that, you can't
use the wrong words. But on the other hand here I am sitting after half
the morning, crammed with ideas and visions, and so on, and can't dis-
lodge them, for lack of the right rhythm. Now this is very profound, what
rhythm is, and goes far deeper than words. A sight, an emotion, creates
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this wave in the mind, long before it makes words to fit it; and in writing
(such is my present belief) one has to recapture this, and set this working
(which has nothing apparently to do with words) and then, as it breaks
and tumbles in the mind, it makes words to fit it. But no doubt I shall
think differently next year.
At present I could say that ants created a wave that broke and tumbled in my
mind — and I made words to fit it — but no doubt I too shall think differently
next year (or even sooner).
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2. Some authors (e.g. Cohen 2005:55) credit Mach with coining
Gedankenexperiment, but Johannes Witt-Hansen (1976) clearly establishes that
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the natural sciences.
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8. Rosi Braidotti (2000:170) argues that ‘the notion of ‘figurations’ — in contrast to
the representational function of ‘metaphors’ — emerges as crucial to Deleuze’s
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